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Kevin C. Knox & Richard Noakes 
 
“Whosoever to the utmost of his finite capacity would see truth as it has actually existed in the mind 
of God from all eternity, he must study Mathematics more than Metaphysics.” 
Nicholas Saunderson, The Elements of Algebra1 
 
AS WE ENTER THE 21st CENTURY it might be possible to imagine the world without 
Cambridge University’s Lucasian professors of mathematics. It is, however, impossible to 
imagine our world without their profound discoveries and inventions. Unquestionably, the 
work of the Lucasian professors has “revolutionised” the way we think about and engage 
with the world: Newton has given us universal gravitation and the calculus, Charles Babbage 
is touted as the “father of the computer”, Paul Dirac is revered for knitting together 
quantum mechanics and special relativity, and Stephen Hawking has provided us with 
startling new theories about the origin and fate of the universe. Indeed, Newton, Babbage, 
Dirac, and Hawking have made the Lucasian professorship the most famous academic chair 
in the world.  
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While these Lucasian professors have been deified and placed in the pantheon of 
scientific immortals, eponymity testifies to the eminence of the chair’s other occupants. 
Accompanying “Newton’s laws of motion, “Babbage’s principle” of political economy, the 
“Dirac delta function” and “Hawking radiation”, we have, among other things, “Barrow’s 
proof” of the fundamental theorem of calculus, the “Saunderson board” (a calculating 
instrument for the vision impaired), “Waring’s theorem” of integers, “Airy’s criterion” of 
telescopic resolving power, “Stokes’s law” of fluid resistance, “Larmor frequency” of atomic 
precession in a magnetic field and “Lighthill’s fourth law of engine noise.” Small wonder, 
then, that scientific and historical literature, as well as a huge array of statuary, tombs, 
stamps, money, relics and the like, bear tribute to these colossal giants of science. Many of 
these homages, like the inscription on Newton’s tomb in Westminster Abbey, put us mere 
mortals in our place: 
Here is buried Isaac Newton, Knight, who by a strength of mind almost divine, and 
mathematical principles peculiarly his own, explored the course and figures of the planets, 
the paths of comets, the tides of the sea, the dissimilarities in rays of light, and, what no 
other scholar has previously imagined, the properties of the colours thus produced. Diligent, 
sagacious and faithful, in his expositions of nature, antiquity and the holy Scriptures, he 
vindicated by his philosophy the majesty of God mighty and good, and expressed the 
simplicity of the Gospel in his manners. Mortals rejoice that there has existed such and so 
great an ornament of the human race!2 
Countless other tributes to Newton and his successors are equally as humbling. Take these 
lines from the obituary notice of George Gabriel Stokes published in the London Times: 
We may enumerate his scientific papers, we may expatiate upon his work in optics or 
hydrodynamics, we may dwell upon his masterly treatment of some of the most abstruse 
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problems of pure mathematics, yet only a select body of experts can readily understand how 
great he was in these various directions, while possibly not all experts understand how much 
greater was the man than all his works … Sir George Stokes was as remarkable for simplicity 
and singleness of aim, for freedom from all personal ambitions and petty jealousies, as the 
breadth and depth of his intellectual equipment. He was a model of what every man should 
be who aspires to be a high priest in the temple of nature.3  
Today, one can make a pilgrimage to a temple – the Cambridge-based Isaac Newton 
Institute for Mathematical Studies – to worship these high priests of nature. There, visitors 
are prompted by a series of artefacts to recapitulate the heroic story of the Lucasian 
professorship. Outside the building are three symbolic statues, representing intuition, genesis 
and creation, as well as an arboret descended from the Woolsthorpe apple tree that allegedly 
inspired Newton to invent his theory of gravitation. Upon entering they are presented with a 
bust of Dirac and a portrait, bust and death-mask of Newton. Clearly, we mortals have 
placed great value on the work of the Lucasian professors, and as a consequence much of 
their handiwork has entered the common coin of our (corruptible) world. We have put 
tremendous faith in the professors and their intellectual products. As trustworthy icons 
corporations even trade on their names. As well as being emblazoned on the old one-pound 
banknotes, Newton has been used to sell everything from apples to zenith telescopes. A 
chain of computer software stores is named after Charles Babbage; in Britain, Stephen 
Hawking, whether aware or not that his predecessor George Biddell Airy had invented a 
method for correcting astigmatism, has endorsed a spectacles retailer.  
 Even without spectacles – or Newton’s telescope for that matter – the Lucasian 
professors are understood to see farther and with unparalleled perspicuity. The professors 
themselves have perceived this legacy. As a young, obstreperous reformer, Charles Babbage 
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deemed Newton’s Principia the “mill stone around the necks” of gownsmen; but in later life 
he reflected how the professorship had been “the only honour I ever received in my own 
country.” The fiscally mindful Babbage gushed that “the names of Barrow and Newton have 
conferred on the Lucasian chair a value far beyond any which mere pecuniary advantage 
would bestow.” Almost every other incumbent has shared Babbage’s deep affinity with 
Newton. Upon graduating at the top of his class, Isaac Milner – later to be Cambridge’s 
seventh Lucasian professor – was “tempted to commit his first act of extravagance. In the 
pride of his heart, he ordered from a jeweller a rather splendid seal, bearing a finely-executed 
head of Sir Isaac Newton.” Other Lucasians have worked even harder to memorialise their 
predecessors. Stokes was asked to arrange and catalogue the unpublished optical papers of 
Newton bequeathed to Cambridge University Library by the Earl of Portsmouth, while 
Stokes himself was made part of that monument of late-Victorian hagiography – the 
Dictionary of Biography – by his successor, Larmor.4 Most of the professors have been humbled 
by the gargantuan legacy that their predecessors bequeathed: “It is nice to feel that one holds 
the same position as Newton and Dirac,” James Lighthill said, “but the real challenge,” he 
admitted, “is to do work that is even a small fraction as significant.” Although Stephen 
Hawking has criticised Newton’s “vitriol and deviousness” he also feels close to the author 
of the Principia. As he has recently quipped, “Newton occupied the Lucasian chair at 
Cambridge that I now hold, though it wasn’t electrically operated at the time.”5 
 From Newton to Hawking recounts the ways these celebrated scientific thinkers have 
conceived their place within the history of the prestigious professorship. Of greater import, 
this book uses the context of the mathematical professorship to examine the extraordinary 
developments in the physical sciences since 1663. These changes relate not simply to the 
technical content of mathematical and scientific enterprises but the diverse array of uses to 
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which such work has been put, from contemplating the origins of the universe to the design 
of quieter jet engines. In addition to this aspect of their work, their astonishing talent, 
tenacious industry and insatiable curiosity helps to explain why the Lucasians have dipped 
their hands in so many things. From Newton to Hawking explores the professors as 
antiquarians, alchemists, orators (Barrow has been called “one of the great orators produced 
by England”), theologians, economists, engineers, politicians and church-music composers, 
as well as pure researchers.6 Accordingly, each chapter of this book provides a social history 
of mathematics, natural philosophy and physics and in so doing shows how the professors 
shared an intense preoccupation with the application of the sciences, both as reliable accounts 
of the natural world and as bases for such “non-scientific” subjects as faith, ethics, politics, 
and aesthetics. 
 Indeed, what emerges from this book is the significant extent to which these non-
scientific topics permeated the enterprises of Lucasian professors at least as much as the 
research, administrative, and pedagogical duties associated with their position. For instance, 
Isaac Newton and his eighteenth-century successors were as determined to restore the basis 
of true Christian faith through a scientifically rigorous Scriptural exegesis as they were 
determined to promote the true (i.e. Newtonian) account of the natural world. Conversely, 
for professors like Charles Babbage and Paul Dirac, their “pure” mathematical research was 
a means for expunging the corrupted mathematical techniques which inevitably led to 
dangerous religious practices and troublesome secular ethics. 
What the book is not is a reference work detailing the administrative details and 
tedious minutiae of the careers of the Lucasian professors. Nor is it a hagiographical account 
of disembodied scientific heroes. Alongside their magnificent triumphs are a number of 
spectacular failures, while the professors themselves have been the objects of scorn, jest, and 
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chastisement. They have had sordid controversies with others and have squabbled amongst 
themselves. The career of Charles Babbage is illustrative: his calculating engine never 
functioned during his lifetime while it was said that “he never functioned as a professor.” 
With his predecessor, George Biddell Airy, he had vigorous disputes over Britain’s railway 
standards and the financing of his computers. He could also be off-putting, to say the least – 
the great Victorian historian, Thomas Carlyle, once reflected how “Babbage continues 
eminently unpleasant to me, with his frog mouth and viper eyes, with his hide-bound 
wooden irony, and the acridest egotism looking through it.” These criticisms of Babbage 
also illustrate how readers of From Newton to Hawking will learn how Cambridge’s most 
distinguished professors fit into (or not!) their contemporary cultures. The point that the 
professors are necessarily products of their time cannot be overestimated. Nevertheless, it is 
a point that habitually has been overlooked, ignored and suppressed. Through careful 
management of the history of the professors, previous accounts of the Lucasian chair – by 
both historians and by the chair’s occupants – have made it appear that the professorship 
transcends time and space. Generally, these accounts have taken it for granted that the 
current professors inhabit the same mental world as their predecessors and present their 
work as a unified, cumulative and coherent “project”.7 
Like Newton’s concept of “flowing time”, this idea of continuity is seductive and it is 
surprising that no publication hitherto has attempted to provide portraits of these men as 
part of a continuous history. Not only have the professors inhabited the same town and 
institution, but many have shared the same laboratories, technicians and research 
programmes. And each professor, in his own way, has envisaged himself as a cog in the 
scholarly corporation, a kind of temporary placeholder in the eternal succession of 
professors. As Hélène Mialet suggests later in the book, the professorial Chair is akin to 
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medieval kingship: although monarchs and Lucasian professors alike command great respect 
in the secular world, their temporal incumbency can seem relatively inconsequential 
compared to the everlasting corporate body they represent. If the professors themselves 
often remark that they are mere markers in a continuum of mathematical splendour, one 
cannot neglect the elements of discontinuity that problematise this grand narrative. One 
might try to imagine Stephen Hawking and Isaac Newton engaged in an animated 
conversation (or as Star Trek envisioned, in a poker game), but it is likely that their lives, 
careers and values would have been utterly alien to each other. While the interests, 
methodologies, habits and research areas of the different professors have been 
extraordinarily diverse, the sciences and the university itself have undergone radical 
transformations that make it difficult to compare professors from different eras. In 1663 the 
conception of the English university as a site of publicly funded experiment was still over 
two centuries away. Restoration Cambridge was not a research institution, nor would the 
varsity become one until the second half of the nineteenth century. Even Newton had 
trouble demonstrating to the republic of letters the value of mathematics and the protracted 
transition of Cambridge from chiefly a religious seminary to a scientific Mecca is an integral 
part of the professors’ history. 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMBRIDGE 
Henry Lucas, who had studied at St. John’s College, believed that he recognised a breach in 
Cantabrigian scholarship. Wanting “to testifie” to his “affection” for Cambridge and for 
learning, he resolved to “ordaine … a yearly stipend and sallerie for a professor … of 
mathematicall sciences in the said Vniversitie.” In his will Lucas said that his endowment 
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would “honor that greate body,” as well as assisting “that parte of learning which hitherto 
hath not bin provided for.”8 Yet, although it is striking that the Lucasian professorship was 
not endowed until the university was over four centuries old, it is, of course, misguided to 
suppose that the varsity was somehow incomplete before a professor of mathematics began 
to grace its schools. Though it may seem so to us, the infiltration of mathematics into the 
Cambridge curriculum was not inevitable. In many senses Cambridge functioned eminently 
well without a mathematics professor. On the one hand, Cambridge produced plenty of able 
mathematicians without an endowed professorship, and there were plenty of tutors capable 
of guiding undergraduates through the rigours of the curriculum. On the other hand, the 
university’s function had little to do with state-of-the-art mathematics. John Wallis – who 
studied at Emmanuel College in the 1630s before embarking on a career at Oxford as the 
Savilian Professor of Geometry – commented on the general low regard for mathematical 
studies in relation to the purpose of the English universities: “Mathematics … were scarce 
looked upon as Academical studies, but rather Mechanical; as the business of Traders, Merchants, 
Seamen, Carpenters, Surveyors of Lands, or the like.” Wallis realized that this opinion concerning 
appropriate scholarly learning reflected certain interests which had been formed centuries 
earlier. For, before the Reformation, Cambridge’s central mission revolved around its service 
to the mighty Roman Church, the university serving to train prospective priests. Following 
the Reformation, Cambridge became the site to seek ecclesiastical preferment within the 
Anglican Church. Accordingly, all undergraduates – whether preparing to return to their 
estate, to make their way in London at the Inns of Court or to enter holy orders – embarked 
on a strict regimen of religious tuition and prayer at their colleges, a tradition that was not 
short-lived. Charles Babbage reminisced how “the sound of the morning chapel bell … 
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call[ing] us to our religious duties” was the only thing that compelled him and his fellow 
undergraduates to end their night-long devotions at whist.9 
Alongside his antipathy towards chapel, Babbage also “acquired a distaste for the 
routine of studies.” In his opinion the curriculum of the early-nineteenth century was 
antiquated, despite – or because of – its heavy emphasis on the Newtonian philosophy. For 
Babbage, the university had suffered from its Elizabethan legacy which from the sixteenth 
century had greatly influenced the trajectory of learning and examinations. During the reign 
of Elizabeth and the next two Stuarts college tutors confronted undergraduates with subjects 
from the trivium, the quadrivium, and the philosophies, their studies likely including logic, 
rhetoric, Aristotelianism, geometry, astronomy and some natural philosophy. By the middle 
of the seventeenth century tutors occasionally foisted the new natural philosophies upon 
their charges, and as an undergraduate it seems that, along with Aristotle and Virgil, Isaac 
Barrow received a dose of Cartesian philosophy. The mandate produced able scholars, but 
not professional mathematicians. 
The Elizabethan statutes also determined how learning was to be displayed. In 
Barrow’s time, oral examinations or “disputations”– not particularly conducive to testing 
mathematical skills – dominated the evaluation of hopeful sophomores and seniors. Pomp, 
ritual and ceremony were the order of the day as students tried to convince examiners, and 
perhaps the occasional royal observer, that they commanded the emblems of good 
scholarship: “To call these disputations merely debates between students,” one historian has 
observed, “is like describing a Spanish bullfight as the killing of a cow”. Even with the 
“Newtonianisation” of the curriculum, the rites and the spectacles associated with the Senate 
House Examination remained vital to the institution. Rather than radically overhauling the 
examination process, mathematical and scientific subjects came to dominate the exams 
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through a glacial process of accretion. Only gradually did the Lucasian professors come to 
play a role in the process.10 
 The history of the professorship is also bound together with that of the colleges. 
Through the benefices of diverse wealthy patrons, the colleges had been founded one by 
one, sprinkled liberally throughout the commercial town, and each virtually independent 
from the others. Their wealth determined the extent to which each constructed its chapels, 
halls, common rooms, libraries, dorms and gardens. Regardless of their assets every college 
armed itself with a battery of bedmakers, cooks, porters and wine stewards to serve its 
master, tutors, fellows and students. As every Lucasian professor swiftly ascertained upon his 
matriculation, collegiate academia was decidedly un-egalitarian; a strict social hierarchy 
governed even the minutia of academic life. While aristocratic students wore resplendent 
garments and dined on high table, lesser born students tended to be at the bottom of the 
social heap. Both Isaac Newton and Isaac Milner entered Cambridge as humble “sizars” at 
their colleges and, accordingly, they were humiliated with chores ranging from ringing chapel 
bells to emptying chamber pots. One could rise from such humble beginnings to triumph 
within the intricate political fabric of the colleges. For instance, colleges ministered a number 
of parishes, and “meretricious” fellows could be presented with these “livings”. Yet, as 
several Lucasian professors discovered, it took plenty of dexterous politicking to rise within 
the collegiate ranks. Apparently Barrow was blessed with such dexterity: he managed to 
procure the mastership of mighty Trinity College. Despite his enormous genius, Barrow’s 
successor was perhaps less savvy in college politics. Newton’s attempt to secure the 
provostship of King’s College was a dismal failure. On the other hand, Milner, who like 
Newton had entered Cambridge as a sizar, ended up the 28th President of Queens’ College. 
Moreover, as John Gascoigne points out in his chapter, the colleges and the central 
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university have continually grappled for supremacy in Cambridge. In terms of the Lucasians, 
this incessant ebb and flow between University and colleges could dramatically affect the 
professors, both in terms of their status and in terms of their role in the instruction of 
students. Often, in this regard, the colleges were pre-eminent, and during these periods of 
collegiate ascendancy the Lucasian professor was somewhat marginalised in the academic 
community. Historically, most colleges found that it was not in their interests to have a 
Lucasian professor. College tutors were quite happy to set academic standards for young 
gownsmen and often viewed professors as little else than meddlers.  
 Nevertheless, the late-Georgian, and then the Victorian, professors began to leave 
their mark, first as examiners for the prestigious Smith’s Prize in mathematics and then as 
influential proponents of curriculum reform. Even though the professors considered 
“Mathematics as the Key to Philosophy, as the Clue to direct us through the secret 
Labyrinths of Nature,” the struggle was always uphill. Many late-Georgian proponents of 
liberal education did not see great value of mathematics to those other than “vulgar 
artisans.” As a freshman Gilbert Wakefield grumbled that Euclid was nothing more than an 
“old carpenter.” Yet, with the prodding of the Lucasian professors, gownsmen came to 
recognise mathematics as an integral part of the philosophical enterprise. After graduating 
Second Wrangler in 1776 even Wakefield changed his tune: “But happy that man! who lays 
the foundation of his future studies deep in the … mathematical philosophy: ... Language sinks 
beneath contemplations so exalted, and so well calculated to inspire the most awful 
sentiments of the GREAT ARTIFICER.”11 Thanks in great part to the professors, the varsity 
began to see the great value of Newtonianism and the mathematical sciences. Thanks also to 
them the Mathematics Tripos, which had evolved from the Senate House Examination, was 
seen as the most “meritocratic” form of evaluating students and it thus became the most 
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prestigious Cambridge examination. By the 1830s, candidates were judged on their ability to 
tackle questions written in English on printed papers – the form that pervades most 
examination systems to this day. Victorian legatees of these exams, such as Stokes and 
Larmor, sat for approximately twenty hour-long papers over a three week period. After their 
exhausting labours they would await very public glory or humiliation as they were ranked as 
either a wrangler (first class), a senior optime (second class), or a junior optime (third class).12 
Since high wranglers had better chances of obtaining fellowships and respectable 
employment, the Mathematics Tripos also fostered the growth of private mathematical 
coaching, and coaches shaped the minds of future professors like George Gabriel Stokes and 
Joseph Larmor. Although not formally recognised by the university, “pupil mongering” 
became such an important part of mathematical instruction that one distinguished Tripos 
graduate could reminisce in 1912 that “had there been no chair in mathematics in the 
University it is probable that the history of the School [of mathematics] would have been 
practically unaltered”.13 Another reason why this may seem so is that in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the dominant figure in changing the content of mathematical instruction 
was not a Lucasian professor, but William Whewell. As a young don, Whewell had welcomed 
the efforts of the Lucasian professors Charles Babbage and Robert Woodhouse to introduce 
Continental methods of mathematical analysis into the curriculum. By the 1830s, however, 
the administratively omnipotent Whewell had become suspicious of analysis. It may have 
been suitable for advanced mathematical research but it was not suitable for Cambridge 
mathematical teaching, whose principle goal was to furnish the nation’s future clergymen, 
lawyers, civil servants, and teachers with a “liberal education”, notably the stable 
mathematical principles provided by such “permanent” subjects as Euclid’s geometry, and 
Newton’s mechanics. Whewell’s “re-geometrisation” and “re-Newtonianisation” of the 
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Tripos in 1848-49 split the Mathematics Tripos into two parts – the first consisting of 
questions on geometrical and non-analytical topics, and the second, which could only be 
taken on succeeding in the first part, embraced the more sophisticated analytical subjects.  
With Whewell at the helm, the new and progressive sciences of heat, electricity and 
magnetism were also excluded from undergraduate teaching. However, by the 1860s the 
importance of electricity and magnetism in educational curricula had risen sharply owing to 
the rapid development of the electric telegraph industry, a commercially, and imperialistically 
crucial enterprise. Furthermore, the researches of high flying wranglers like William 
Thomson and James Clerk Maxwell gave these new sciences a rigorous mathematical 
foundation and thus secured them a “permanent” place in the Cambridge curriculum. This 
was part of a wider change in mid-Victorian transformation of science teaching in 
Cambridge, a change owing much to the efforts of an 1850 Royal Commission to help the 
ancient British universities provide scientific instruction in line with the “requirements of 
modern times”.14 The university had already responded to the burgeoning need to prepare 
students for the industrialised modern times by founding the Natural Sciences Tripos (first 
examined in 1851). It continued to respond from the 1860s by creating new professorships 
and buildings. Long gone were the days of Isaac Newton and Isaac Milner, both of who had 
constructed their laboratories in their private residences. By the end of the nineteenth 
century the “New Museums Site” boasted (along with museums of zoology, botany and 
mineralogy), laboratories, workshops, and an optical and astronomical lecture room for the 
Lucasian professors.15 
Despite these advancements, the nineteenth century Lucasians were often 
exasperated by the sluggish rate of change, as well as their remuneration. In 1857, eight years 
into his professorship, Stokes frequently wrote to his fiancée, agonising over how they might 
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achieve that desideratum of bourgeois Victorian society – respectability in married life. 
Reflecting on the deliberations of a University Council enquiry into the endowment of 
professorships, Stokes suggested that his position would be improved if fellowships 
remained open to married dons. “If I were called into residence and my Fellowship were 
added to the Professorship”, Stokes explained,  
our situation would be far, far pleasanter. I should be in a fixed and highly respectable 
position instead of being like a “bookseller’s hack” as Airy expressed it to me. … I should do 
one thing well (at least I hope so) instead of having so many dissimilar things to attend to 
that I feel as if I were doing them all badly. I should have (probably) much more leisure for 
researches, which would then become part of my business, to keep up the reputation of the 
Chair .16 
Stokes was initially disappointed since his college, Pembroke, did not abolish its celibacy 
restrictions on fellowships for another decade. Like many Victorian physicists, he had to 
provide for his new family with teaching and administrative “hackwork”. In 1860, however, 
most of the original Lucasian statutes were officially repealed, bringing the chair in line with 
professional academic positions elsewhere in the country. While they gave the Vice-
chancellor and elected officers the power to “admonish” or sack the professor if he was 
“wilfully neglectful of his duties, or guilty of gross or habitual immorality,” the statutes also 
raised the income of the professorship by dipping into the money from Lady Sadler’s 
benefaction of 1710. In 1886 the university channelled further monies into the Lucasian 
chair whose income had fallen owing to effects of the agricultural depression on the 
Bedfordshire estates on which the original endowment depended. By 1914 the professorship 
was regulated by the same statutes that governed most other university chairs, with the 
holder’s main duty being to “devote himself to the research and the advancement of 
knowledge in his department and to give lectures in every year.”17 
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These nineteenth-century transformations, along with Stokes’s enthusiasm for both 
the mathematical and natural sciences Triposes, made Cambridge sciences a popular choice 
for undergraduates. But like many Victorians, Stokes was more sceptical of another change 
that was to affect the work of the Lucasian professorship, let alone that of other Cambridge 
pedagogues: the admission of women students. As Gillian Sutherland has written, 
“Cambridge was initially hostile towards women with academic ambitions, deeply reluctant 
even to tolerate their presences and for a long time treated them as marginal figures.” 
Indeed, until the late-nineteenth century, most Lucasian professors considered cleaning and 
cooking to be the only appropriate activities for females within college gates. Before 
Victoria’s reign, most official references to women were in the form of decrees by the Vice-
chancellor concerning “provisions against public-women.” Thus, in an age when the 
“weaker vessel” were seen as distractions from serious study, Newton once accused John 
Locke of having “endeavoured to embroil me wth weomen”. 18 
There were some exceptions to this general anxiety about the participation of 
females in the philosophical enterprise. In an attempt (albeit patronising) to include women 
in the study of mathematics, Nicholas Saunderson and John Colson collaborated on a 
translation of The Lady’s System of Analyticks (though not published until 1801), written by 
their counterpart in Bologna, Professor Donna Maria Gaelana Agnesi. Despite its intended 
audience, Charles Babbage read the book as a freshman and admitted that from it he 
“acquired some knowledge.”19 Babbage’s greater debt was to Byron’s daughter, Lady Ada 
Augusta, who created, promoted and sustained a forum for his analytical engine. Ada 
Lovelace, however, was never a student at Cambridge, for it was not until Stokes’s era that 
females were first admitted as undergraduates (although they were not granted full university 
membership until 1948!). And though Stokes himself worried that female students would 
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“impair the heritage of men,” his biographer reported how he “was much pleased when a 
Newnham lady who had attended his lectures brought him some original work which he 
approved.”20 
The twentieth century Lucasian professors have responded to changes from other 
directions, not least the dramatic increases in scale of experimental and theoretical physics, 
applied mathematics, astronomy, cosmology, and computing science. Neither Larmor nor 
Dirac had the size of international research schools boasted by Ernest Rutherford or 
Frederick Gowland Hopkins, but their careers exhibited the internationalism that was 
increasingly pervading the sciences, whether this meant attending international conferences, 
taking up overseas professorships, or managing trans-Atlantic professional relationships. 
With the notable exception of Lighthill, the work of twentieth century Lucasian professors 
could hardly be described as “big science” as far as the material cultures of their projects are 
concerned. And yet, their researches have depended on the dramatic development of large-
scale research facilities. Larmor’s and Dirac’s evolving conceptions of the innermost 
structure of matter were built in conjunction with evidence generated across the globe, from 
Rutherford’s Cavendish to Fermilab. Similarly, Hawking’s revolutionary work on general 
relativity has been made possible by Cambridge’s Mullard Radio Astronomy Observatory.  
The steady expansion and rising status of twentieth-century Cambridge mathematics 
– both in terms of numbers of practitioners and sub-disciplines – is reflected in the 
establishment of two separate departments of mathematics, the Department of Applied 
Mathematics and Theoretical Physics (founded 1959) and the Department of Pure 
Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics (founded 1964). The increasing independence of 
Cambridge’s departments of mathematics from the colleges is even more strikingly 
symbolised by one of the newest features on Cambridge’s landscape: the Cambridge Centre 
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of Mathematical Studies (completed in October 2001). This lavish new home for 
Cambridge’s mathematics departments is geographically far removed from the colleges and 
close to those other jewels in Cambridge’s crown of physical sciences – the (new) Cavendish 
Laboratory and the Institute of Astronomy (including the Royal Greenwich Observatory). It 
is also the place where the current Lucasian professor works and, owing to its physical 
proximity to its disciplinary brethren, can help the Lucasians develop even closer alliances 
with experimental physics and astronomy. This shift in geography also signals the 
diminishing significance of the colleges, the humanities’ departments and the School of 
Divinity to the professors. It begs the question of how their principles have shifted over the 
course of four centuries. 
 
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS PROFESSORS 
Shortly after Newton published his Principia, Richard Marsh, a divine ensconced in St. John’s 
College, delivered a fiery sermon to his Cantabrigian cohorts. While many parts of western 
Europe were beginning to embrace the Newtonian philosophy, Marsh was distraught that 
mathematics would usurp revelation. From the pulpit he bristled that in the Mosaic account 
of Creation he met “with no Laws of Gravity.” Rhetorically, he asked the modern 
philosophers, “what reason have I to believe the wonders of your Comet, more than any 
other Romance?”21 
 As well as the extent to which Newtonianism would be attacked as a philosophy 
antithetical to revealed religion, Marsh’s brimstone is a telling reminder of the strong relation 
between religion and the scientific products of the Lucasians. For Newton this relation was, 
of course, intentional: as he told the Master of Trinity College, Richard Bentley, “When I 
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wrote my treatise about our Systeme I had an eye upon such Principles as might work wth 
considering men for ye beleife of a Deity & nothing can rejoyce me more than to find it 
usefull for that purpose.”22 Cantabrigian scholars had for some time viewed mathematical 
philosophy an efficacious means to contemplate the Grand Artificer. A generation before 
Newton’s arrival in Cambridge, the King’s College graduate William Oughtred addressed “the 
english Gentrie” when he was accused of neglecting his calling as an Anglican priest: 
in all ages many of the most eminent in the sublimity of Theologie, have beene also 
conversent in the study of the Mathematicks; … And in no other thing, after his sacred 
word, Almighty God (who creating all things in number, weight, and measure, doth most 
exactly Geometrize), hath left, more expresse prints of his heavenly & infallible truth, then in 
these Sciences.”23 
In particular, Newton regarded mathematical philosophy as a powerful instrument for 
combating the “pious frauds, false miracles & juggling tricks in matters of religion.” 
Assuming that “gentile astrology and theology were introduced by cunning priests to 
promote the study of the stars,” he presumed that by restoring the pristine natural 
philosophy of the ancients he could help eradicate the corrupted religious practices that he 
so despised.  
Conceiving his labour to generate the prisca sapienta as a process of re-discovery, 
Newton placed himself within a conception of Time that, like the sectaries of the English 
Civil War and many Restoration natural philosophers, located his own lifetime as the critical 
overture to the Millennium. Accordingly, his successor in the Lucasian chair, William 
Whiston, commented that the Principia should be construed as “an eminent prelude and 
preparation to those happy times of the restitution of all things.”24 For Newton and several 
of the eighteenth-century scientific professors of Cambridge, the time had come for a true 
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reading of the two Books – Nature and Scripture – and with it, the natural processes that 
would testify to the “renovation[,] regeneration or restitution of the ye world and ye second 
coming of Christ.”25 He was following a robust Cambridge tradition that the professors of 
the eighteenth century would perpetuate. While Newton had helped Thomas Burnet 
compose his 1681 Sacred Theory of the Earth, Whiston availed himself of the Master’s mature 
mathematical philosophy to pen his 1696 New Theory of the Earth. Notably, Whiston used the 
properties of comets to exegete Scripture and bring Burnet’s natural theology up-to-date. 
Adding to Newton’s suggestion that comets deposited re-vitalising aethers to a spiritually 
depleted earth, Whiston equated comets with Hell: combining their apogaeic “Darkness of 
Torment” and their perigaeic “ungodly Smoak of Fire,” comets became “the Place of 
Punishment for wicked Men after the general Resurrection.”26  
In comparing Whiston’s confident exegesis to the work of his twentieth- and twenty-
first-century successors, one might envisage the history of the chair as a reflection of the 
increasing secularisation of scientific knowledge. This interpretation is tempting. Take the 
materialism of Charles Babbage. In promising to reduce “Miracles” to pre-set “irregularities” 
in a his Analytical Engine, Babbage turned prophetic wisdom into a mechanical exercise: 
“the maker of the calculating engine,” he gloated, “would thus be gifted with the power of 
prophecy.” A century later Wolfgang Pauli wittily said of Dirac’s spiritual leaning that he 
“has a new religion. There is no God and Dirac is his prophet.” Among the numerous 
comments that Stephen Hawking has made concerning the relation of theoretical physics to 
religion, he has recently noted, “General relativity could not predict what should emerge 
from the Big Bang. Some saw this as an indication of God’s freedom to start the universe off 
in any way God wanted, but others (including myself) felt that the beginning of the universe 
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should be governed by the same laws that held at other times.” Elsewhere Hawking has 
elaborated on this commitment:  
We are such insignificant creatures on a minor planet of a very average star in the outer 
suburbs of one of a hundred thousand million galaxies. So it is difficult to believe in a God 
that would care about us or even notice our existence. … [But] it is difficult to discuss the 
beginning of the Universe without mentioning the concept of God. My work on the origin 
of the Universe is on the borderline between science and religion, but I try to stay on the 
scientific side of the border. It is quite possible that God acts in ways that cannot be 
described by scientific laws. But in that case one would just have to go on personal belief.27 
Hawking’s religious beliefs certainly contrast markedly with those of most of his 
predecessors, for most Lucasian professors through the age of Stokes published theological 
works. While Newton, because of his heretical views, was unwilling to put his religious 
beliefs into print, the eighteenth-century professors were eager to demonstrate the accord 
between religion, the natural sciences and mathematics: among his prodigious outpourings 
Whiston published A New Theory of the Earth (1696) The Accomplishment of Scripture Prophecy 
(1708) and Astronomical Principles of Religion, Natural and Reveal’d (1717); in the 1730s John 
Colson demonstrated the breadth of his learning with his Historical, Critical, Geographical, 
Chronological, and Etymological Dictionary of the Holy Bible; to rebut David Hume’s knock at 
English natural science and revealed religion, Edward Waring penned An Essay on the 
Principles of Human Knowledge; similarly, his successor and Doctor of Divinity, Isaac Milner, 
produced An Essay on Human Liberty in addition to his co-authored seven volume Ecclesiastical 
History in his bid to apply “knowledge of natural philosophy and mathematics to … stem the 
torrent of scepticism and infidelity … inundating this Empire”28 
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Nineteenth-century Lucasians were also active in producing religious ruminations. 
Alongside his hymns, Thomas Turton produced Natural theology considered with reference to Lord 
Brougham's discourse on that subject (1836) and was also immersed in the debate concerning 
dissenters’ access to higher learning, providing his Thoughts on the admission of persons, without 
regard to their religious opinions, to certain degrees in the Universities of England in 1834. Irritated by 
the Bridgewater Treatises, eight best-sellers of the 1830s that upheld natural evidence for divine 
design and intervention, Charles Babbage penned his unofficial and fragmentary Ninth 
Bridgewater Treatise (1837), which retorted that miracles were not the result of Divine whim, 
but the product of natural law programmed by God. A generation later, attempts to 
reconcile the two Books by George Gabriel Stokes, a life-long evangelical Anglican, 
demonstrates that the history of the Lucasian chair is not a straightforward story of 
secularisation. Stokes’s tenure coincided with potent challenges – by the likes of the authors 
of Essays and Reviews (1860) and champions of Charles Darwin – to the cultural authority of 
the established Church and the plausibility of the Biblical narrative. He responded with 
numerous religious tracts and books, including his Gifford Lectures of 1891–3, and 
addresses to Church Congresses. He was also President of the Victoria Institute, established 
in 1865 to uphold the belief that the claims of science and Scriptural truths were in harmony. 
This would lead his arch opponent, Darwinian champion and high priest of the “Church 
Scientific” Thomas Henry Huxley, to criticise angel “Gabriel” for abusing scientists by 
allying them with “everything Churchy & reactionary”.29 
Even where physics had been invoked by Darwin’s guardians, Stokes did not think it 
had been done so legitimately. Instead, he evoked an immaterial gravitational force or 
luminiferous ether acting on ponderable matter in order to make plausible the notion of 
God guiding nature. Joseph Larmor was less vocal than Stokes, but he shared his 
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predecessor’s Protestant Irish upbringing and, as Andrew Warwick has suggested, protestant 
values underpinned his belief in measuring the motion of the earth relative to the ether. 
While the Irish Protestant physicist Frederick Trouton accused Larmor of becoming “much 
more catholic” in his “scientific beliefs” in accepting Einstein’s Relativity, Larmor remained 
a “sturdy Protestant of Science” since he shared little with Einstein, remaining convinced 
that a dynamic aether was indispensable to an intelligible electromagnetic theory.30 
Critical too for the “sturdy protestants of science” was a sharp distinction between 
the body and the intellect. Until Dirac’s tenure, the Lucasian professors were “naturally led 
to observe a remarkable difference between the operations of matter and of the mind.” 
Early-modern professors, like Isaac Milner, believed that it was critical to show that 
“immaterial substances are essentially different from material ones; and … seem to be 
possessed of certain active principles.” Paradoxically, while the professors suggested that this 
ontological principle made the sciences subservient to religion, it also elevated the 
importance of their experimental work. Because of their unique understanding of the 
material world, the professors used their knowledge of the “established principles of 
Experimental Philosophy” to comment on “brute” matter’s passivity and its dependence 
upon thinking substances. Newton’s self experimentation with a knitting needle upon his 
own eye is illustrative: by showing that vision was contingent upon the voluntary actions of 
the mind (and not upon the manual manipulation of one’s eyeball!) he felt that he had 
provided evidence against Thomas Hobbes’s atheistic materialism. Similarly, during 
Victoria’s reign, when physicist John Tyndall associated the relatively new principle of energy 
conservation with a materialistic and deterministic account of man’s evolution, Stokes 
retaliated with his notion of “‘directionism” which buttressed his intense Pauline dualism. 
He argued that an immaterial mind could direct energy flow in a material body and still be 
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consistent with the new energy physics, making plausible the notion of mind independent of 
the corporeal body. 
Hitched to this commitment to Cartesian duality has been a general wont by 
commentators to emphasise the difference between the professors’ bodies and their minds. 
Disembodiment has become a vital ingredient in Lucasian lore. Famously, the Marquis de 
l’Hôpital wondered, “Does Newton eat, drink and sleep as other men do, or is he a genius 
deprived of bodily form?” More recently, Michael White has noted of Stephen Hawking’s 
illness that “the disease has not touched the essence of his being, his mind, and so has not 
affected his work.” Historians Steven Shapin and Christopher Lawrence have proposed that 
an underlying source of this familiar trope is the longstanding predilection to disembody 
knowledge claims since this makes them seem more authentic: “the worth of knowledge,” 
they note, “has been linked to its stipulated elevation above the mundane and the 
corporeal.” Since it has been assumed that physical perceptions by unreliable bodies have 
been consistent sources of the corruption of knowledge, truth and the body have been 
“pervasively set in opposition” and scientific practise has been readily disengaged from 
embodied investigators.31 
Arguably, this is a reason why stories about the professors’ indifference to the 
corporeal are plentiful. Paul Dirac’s stoicism and monastic habitat are legendary and possibly 
only rivalled by his Cantabrigian contemporary, Ludwig Wittgenstein: “living in a simply 
furnished attic in St. John’s College,” Dirac “had a wooden desk of the kind which is used in 
schools” at which he apparently wrote his “great work straight off.” It has been suggested 
that “he would have been a very contented martyr.” For Dirac’s predecessor, Joseph 
Larmor, running water and other twentieth-century conveniences seemed superfluous to 
good scholarship. One obituarist noted that he questioned “[modern trends even in such 
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matters as the installation of baths in the College (1920),” and pooh-poohed demands for 
plumbing improvements: “We have done without them for 400 years, why begin now?” he 
proclaimed in a College committee. (Unsurprisingly, it was often noted that he neglected his 
appearance in his later age.). Newton was “so intent” upon his studies “that he ate 
sparingly,” if he remembered to dine at all. One wit commented that “his cat grew very fat 
on the food left standing in his tray.” Apparently, Barrow epitomised the dishevelled 
professor, being “scholarlike, negligent of his dress and personal appearance to a fault.” 
“Once,” Barrow’s biographer continued, “when he preached for Dr Wilkins at St. Lawrence, 
Jewry, the congregation were so disgusted with his uncouth exterior that all but a few rushed 
out of church.”32 
The professors have not been utterly indifferent to the material world. Along with 
accounts of the their ambivalence to the mundane world are a number of counterexamples. 
These accounts have served several purposes: first, they have given the professors a human 
face and have shown that a healthy mind is contingent upon a healthy body; second, they 
have been used to help explain the mediocrity of particular professors; and third, they 
recount the heroics that are sometimes needed to pursue truth. So, while he initially saw no 
reason to have St John’s re-plumbed, Joseph Larmor eventually capitulated to the bliss of 
hot water on tap: “once the innovation was made he was a regular user. Morning by morning 
in a mackintosh and cap, in which he was not seen at other times, he found his way across 
the bridge to the New Court baths.” In contrast to the Marquis de l’Hôpital’s aethereal 
portrait of Newton, others painted the professor as a robust scholar “Sir I[saac] thus 
exercised at once his body & his mind [a]s the operations of the soul depends upon the 
condition of the organs of the body …” Paulo Frisi also noted that “he had lost but a single 
tooth, he never made use of spectacles, he retained a lively eye, a venerale aspect and an 
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elegant stature” And while Newton “gave up tobacco” because he was determined “not be 
dominated by habits,” his predecessor, finding that it “tended to compose and regulate his 
thoughts,” loved smoking. Barrow christened the New World leaf his “panpharmacon.” In 
an age of roast-beef eating and beer swilling, the inaugural professor was also “inordinately 
fond of fruit.” Nicholas Saunderson preferred his fruit fermented, and happily succumbed to 
a number of other worldly pleasures. He was renowned for his “indulgence of women, wine, 
and profane swearing to … a shocking excess.” Half a century later Isaac Milner also proved 
that he could be a bon viveur. It is doubtful if he “indulged” in women, but he was not one to 
pass up a good meal or a fine bottle of claret. One astonished visitor to Queens’ College 
reported Milner to be the “most enormous man I ever encountered in a drawing room.” In 
contrast to the stoicism of Newton and Dirac, the evangelical Milner was also a whiner: “my 
whole life has been one of suffering.”33 
 Milner was also “fond of describing himself an invalid” and used illness to shirk 
professorial duties. In this regard he was utterly unlike Stephen Hawking and Nicholas 
Saunderson, both who amazed the world by overcoming their disabilities. In his own lifetime 
the blind Saunderson confounded Europeans with his extraordinary memory, his impeccable 
hearing, his remarkable sense of touch and his ability to teach optics. Such were Saunderson’s 
amazing skills that Denis Diderot imagined the professor to be the ultimate test of John 
Locke’s theory of perception. Like Hawking, Saunderson’s disability led him to develop 
novel techniques for manipulating equations in his head. While most scientists use reams of 
paper in their careers, the fact that neither Hawking nor Saunderson put pen to paper has 
meant that both found innovative methods to tackle, and produce novel solutions for, 
intransigent problems. Yet, while Saunderson’s disability led Diderot to question God’s 
benevolence, Hawking’s amyotrophic lateral sclerosis has led twenty- and twenty-first 
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commentators to think of him as a kind of angel. Deprived of a healthy body he has become 
an example of how a beautiful mind can triumph in a corrupt material world.  
With the other professors, Hawking’s essence has often been deemed spiritual and 
therefore not political; but, paradoxically, since the work of the professors has been 
understood to be unencumbered by social interests it is often deployed to serve very political 
interests. The four centuries that From Newton to Hawking spans were amongst the most 
dramatic in Britain’s technological, economic, and social, and military history. It 
encompasses the industrial revolution and the arrival of the information age, the rise and fall 
of Britain’s Empire, radical shifts in the social and political status of Britons, and countless 
bloody conflicts. Although they did not always comment on these wider contexts, the 
meaning of the Lucasian professors’ achievements would be distorted if these contexts were 
not considered. 
Beginning with its first incumbent, Lucasian professors have worked in the midst of 
great political ferment. Isaac Barrow, an exemplary Royalist, left England for a number of 
years while the ravages of England’s Civil War and the Interregnum played out. Pointing to 
both his famous publications and his obscure manuscripts, historians now routinely talk of 
Newton’s “politico-theology”. As Newton himself affirmed, there was a strong “analogy 
between the world natural and the world politick.” So, while Newton was composing his 
Principia in the mid 1680s, he was also feverishly penning his “Theologiæ gentilis origines 
philosophicæ,” which detailed the defilement of ancient natural philosophy for political ends. 
Moreover, Newton, his followers and even his detractors understood that the 1687 Principia 
could be recognised as a piece of political science. Like Locke’s political treatises, Newton’s 
work was used to justify the Glorious Revolution and ensuing Whig hegemony. His 
mathematical philosophy, like the interpretation of Boyle’s pneumatics by his colleague 
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Henry More, at once countered pure mechanism, the pantheism of sectarians, and the 
absolutism of Catholics. Conical sections, cometography, universal gravity and a mostly empty 
universe offered keys to a new Whig order and though the doggerel will not find its way into 
the literary canon, J.T. Desaguliers’ 1727 The Newtonian System of the World, the Best Model for 
Government does exemplify how Georgian Britons could derive political messages from the 
Master’s work. 34 
Similarly, we cannot properly explain the involvement of the Lucasian professors in 
the Longitude problem (notably Newton, Whiston, Waring and Milner) or in the production 
of better nautical almanacs (specifically Babbage and Airy) without appreciating the imperial, 
political, and economic importance of a strong Royal Navy. The Revolutionary era also 
weighed in heavily as the professors saw how science could be deployed to attack established 
rule. The cool reception of Continental analysis in Cambridge underlines how early-
nineteenth century Britons associated European mathematics with the bloody French 
Revolution. The following generation of professors were less apt to cringe at mathematical 
and chemical works from across the Channel. Babbage’s promotion of Continental 
mathematical tools for increasing efficiency in mental labour was inextricably linked to his 
contributions to fierce debates over the new factory system. By the 1840s the tools of 
Continental analysis were integral parts of Cambridge Mathematics Tripos. One beneficiary 
of this system was Stokes, who sought to provide the nation’s future masters of industry 
with the practical and intellectual skills needed to sustain one of Britain’s most powerful 
weapons of long-range imperial control – the electric telegraph. The telegraph helped keep 
the Empire together, something that both Stokes and Larmor, who as Irish Protestant Tories 
opposed Home Rule, were eager to see. 
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Other social and cultural shifts that have taken place in Britain in the century since 
Stokes’s death have had a clear impact on the world of the Lucasian professor. The dramatic 
broadening of the educational opportunities of scholars are traceable in the transformed 
gender, social, and ethnic composition of the people working with the current Lucasian 
professor. The technological descendants of the Victorian telegraphic network have also 
contributed to the “information” revolution that has fed back into Cambridge mathematics. 
New media technologies have helped make Hawking the centre of a global, cutting-edge 
communication network in theoretical physics as well as an influential political commentator. 
Today’s cultures of mathematics is exemplified by the new Cambridge-based “Millennium 
Mathematics Project” which fully exploits the latest web technologies “to help people of all 
ages and abilities share in the excitement of mathematics and understand the enormous 
range and importance of its applications to science and commerce.”35 
 
III. THE PROFESSORSHIP IN A NUTSHELL  
Though none of the seventeen Lucasian professors of Mathematics would have described 
themselves as statisticians, their lives have generated some interesting figures. Thirteen of the 
Lucasians have been fellows of the prestigious Royal Society. Neither John Colson, nor 
Thomas Turton nor Joshua King could find either the backing or muster the energy to gain 
membership. Notoriously, Newton, as the society’s president and being of a “fearful, 
cautious and suspicious temper,” did not support Whiston’s gambit for admittance.36 Besides 
Newton, only one other Lucasian professor has been the Society’s president – George 
Biddell Airy – although both George Gabriel Stokes and Joseph Larmor served as secretary. 
Edward Waring (1784), Airy (1831), Stokes (1893), Dirac (1952) and Lighthill (1998) all 
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received the society’s prestigious Copley Medal, while most others have been prominent 
within the Royal Society. 
Other awards, decorations and honours have been showered upon the band. 
Although one only – Paul Dirac – has received a Nobel Prize (the prize was not established 
until 1901), more time-honoured rewards have been plentiful: five have been knighted 
(Newton, Airy, Stokes, Larmor and Lighthill) and one can reasonably expect that Hawking 
might soon be called “Sir Stephen.” Isaac Barrow (Trinity), Isaac Milner (Queens’), George 
Gabriel Stokes (Pembroke), and Joshua King (Queens’) were all rewarded with the 
mastership of their respective colleges, while University College London snagged James 
Lighthill as its provost. As discussed earlier, Newton’s inability to secure the provostship at 
King’s College was one of his few failures, though he was, however, elected to Parliament 
(twice), a triumph that is only slightly overshadowed by the fact that the only record of him 
speaking within the House of Commons was a request to have shut a draught-causing 
window. Alongside Newton, George Gabriel Stokes and Joseph Larmor also represented 
Cambridge as MPs while, famously, Charles Babbage twice stood unsuccessfully for the 
borough of Finsbury. 
Most Lucasians have been concerned with eternal rewards, both for themselves and 
for their fellow Christians. Although none did so in the twentieth century, seven – Barrow, 
Whiston, Colson, Waring, Milner, Turton and Stokes – donned the vestments of the 
Anglican Church. Indeed, Thomas Turton was elevated to the see of Ely after he stepped 
down from his mathematics’ chair. Such was his antipathy towards the Church established, 
that Newton sought a special dispensation from the King in order to avoid taking Holy 
Orders; but only the foolish have suggested that his evasion had anything to do with an 
inclination towards the secular.  
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Whiston, like Newton, loathed the doctrine of the holy and undivided Trinity. This 
deep commitment to Arianism leads also to another statistic: branded a heretic by the 
University’s vice-chancellor, he is the only Professor to have been unwillingly removed from 
the Chair. Besides Whiston, none, to our knowledge, have been suspected of transgressing 
the professorial statute involving “treason, heresy, schism, voluntary manslaughter, notable 
theft, adultery, fornication or perjury.” Nor do any past Lucasian professors seem to have 
arrested for any other crimes or misdemeanours. Accordingly, all but one election for the 
professorship has been precipitated by either wilful resignation or the death of the 
incumbent, the former being slightly more common. Resignation accounts also for trimming 
the average length of tenure – almost exactly twenty years. Stokes, weighing in for an 
astounding 54 years is almost singularly responsible for driving up the average: meanwhile 
the tenures of Airy, Woodhouse and Turton combined could not see through the 1820s. 
These Lucasians and the rest of the professors, however, have shared one obvious 
characteristic: they have all been white males.  
 These statistics are illuminating. They fail, however, to uncover the extent to which 
each professor has been embedded within the cultures in which he deployed his expertise. 
Along with a journey through the professors’ great triumphs (and a few humiliating defeats), 
From Newton to Hawking travels through three-and-a-half centuries to find these diverse 
scientific cultures. Though readers of this book will discover some fascinating continuities 
over the duration of the professorship, these cultures will also show how different the 
professorship of the twenty-first century is from 1663, when the chair was endowed.  
In the first chapter Moti Feingold recounts the protracted search for a benefactor 
with the wherewithal to establish a “mathematicus professor honorarius ... with a House of 
Purpose.” While reminding us that the absence of the mathematical professorship should 
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not be construed as a lack of mathematical activity at the varsity, he also shows why Henry 
Lucas’s endowment and the work of the inaugural professor, Isaac Barrow, were so valuable 
to the institution. Although some commentators may have felt that Barrow was “but a child 
in comparison to his pupil Newton,” Feingold convinces us that Barrow’s profound and 
ambitious studies, and particularly his research in optics, cannot be taken lightly. In addition, 
he addresses an apparent paradox that the first Lucasian professor presents: although 
Barrow considered mathematics the “fruitful Mother of all Disciplines, and benign Nurse of 
all Studies,” he was deeply resistant to publishing his mathematical work, even complaining 
to a fellow divine that he was “wasting [his] time and intellect” in mathematics. In pointing 
to the tension between Barrow’s love for the mathematical sciences and devotion to 
theology, Feingold’s portrait of Barrow sets the stage for discussion of his tormented 
successor. 
Robert Iliffe’s account of Isaac Newton masterly synthesises the radically diverse 
activities of the second Lucasian professor. Unearthing the full extent of Newton’s 
intellectual activities and contextualising these within his Cantabrigian and metropolitan 
scientific milieux, Iliffe portrays the “Great Man” as a psychologically troubled mortal, but a 
mortal who believed that he was on a mission from God. Constantly distinguishing himself 
from “the vulgar,” Newton conceived his divinely sanctioned role to involve the recovery of 
uncorrupted ancient truths, both scientific and religious. So, though we may remember 
Newton for his major contributions to mathematics, astronomy and optics, Iliffe tells us we 
must not forget that the “Great Man” was just as much a revolutionary in alchemy and 
theology. Only with an appreciation of these interests, can we begin to fathom the truly 
radical nature of Newton’s work, not to mention the extent of his remarkable genius. 
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 Newton was a hard act to follow. In his influential study of “Enlightenment 
Cambridge,” D.A. Winstanley observed that “Cambridge in the eighteenth century was sadly 
lacking in eminent mathematicians.” This pronouncement has been reiterated by the 
Lucasian professors themselves: “There is no doubt that there was a stagnation in 
scholarship in Cambridge throughout the eighteenth century,” complained Sir James 
Lighthill: “this unreformed Cambridge was really bad. A great pity really.”37 But, in From 
Newton to Hawking, the chapters devoted to the eighteenth-century professors show that this 
supposition is unwarranted. Though the age may not have been an heroic one for 
Cantabrigian natural philosophy, it was nonetheless one of vibrant activity. Of course much 
of this activity was directed at interpreting, protecting and disseminating the unparalleled 
genius of Newton. Newton’s work, the eighteenth-century Professors believed, had 
catapulted Britain into a new age. The judicious use of his philosophy would solve scientific, 
technological, religious and political problems. Along with “Newtonianising” other fields of 
enquiry from theology to medicine, it was therefore the mission of the eighteenth-century 
professors to broadcast the existing gospel of Newton. But what, exactly, this gospel was was 
open to debate, even amongst the mathematical professors themselves. Since his corpus was 
so gargantuan and so enigmatic, Newton’s intellectual legacy was fraught with difficulties. 
Each professor found that he needed to interpret Newton in order to fight the growing 
number of enemies who found the Newtonian philosophy intellectually and morally 
bankrupt.  
The “Great Man’s” immediate successor, William Whiston, epitomised this ambition 
to defend Newton’s work and to bring his “Divine Philosophy within Reach” of mortal 
Britons. Moreover, where Newton had held his theological cards close to his chest, Whiston 
brazenly – and, perhaps, cavalierly – applied the scientific reasonings of the Principia and the 
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Opticks to scriptural exegesis. In their treatment of his extraordinary attempt to render both 
Newton’s philosophy and Scripture transparent (via Newton’s natural philosophy), Stephen 
Snobelen and Larry Stewart follow Whiston’s unconventional path from the private serenity 
of cloistered Cambridge to the public bustle of Augustan London. Banishment from 
Cambridge, they argue, was only one of many signs that Whiston was embroiled in the chief 
religious controversies of the era. By delineating his great success in the metropolis Snobelen 
and Stewart show also that his expulsion from the university, seemingly paradoxically, 
enabled a career boost as Whiston found “fame and fortune” in both metropolitan 
coffeehouses and in print. Whether “solving the Longitude” with exploding mortars, linking 
comets to Noahic catastrophe and “Divine Vengeange”, or galvanising polite audiences with 
fantastic electrical phenomena, Snobelen and Stewart show precisely why it was difficult not 
to listen to Whiston. 
With the rustication of Newton’s successor from Cambridge, Edmund Halley 
quipped that “Whiston was dismissed for having too much religion, and Saunderson 
preferred for having none.” Nevertheless, the story of Nicholas Saunderson and his 
successor, John Colson, is as much one of continuity as it is of discontinuity. Although 
neither professor antagonised the Anglican Establishment as did “wicked Whiston”, both 
Saunderson and Colson emulated Whiston’s endeavours to make popular the central tenets 
of Newton’s œuvre and to vanquish detractors of the “Great Man”. John Gascoigne pays 
special attention to the pedagogical enterprises of these two Lucasians. In so doing he shows 
also how their work chimed in with the other Cambridge Newtonians who, locking horns 
with the likes of Bishop Berkeley, were anxious to establish that Newton’s philosophy led 
neither to “absurdity” nor to the “heresies of infidels”. John Colson, for instance, saw 
Newton’s Method of Fluxions to the press, not simply to give Britons better access to a 
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powerful analytical tool but to ensure that the “visible and sensible form” of the fluxional 
calculus led directly to godly truths. Although not having access to the “visible,” the blind 
Saunderson did give his mathematical practise a “sensible form” and this leads Gascoigne to 
a discussion of how the professor’s physical disadvantage gave the Enlightenment minds of 
Denis Diderot, Samuel Johnson and Edmund Burke pause to consider relationships between 
sense experience, ideas and the nature of the Deity. 
 Like Saunderson and Colson, the following two Lucasian professors, the “awkward” 
and “melancholic” Edward Waring and the “arrogant” and “incomparable” Isaac Milner, 
were anxious to preserve the status of Cambridge dons as the authentic representatives of 
Newton and to use this status to quash the increasingly hostile attacks on the university. 
Touching upon the intellectual products of the Enlightenment and the major shifts in the 
sciences, as well as the revolutionary contexts of the fin-de-siècle, Kevin Knox shows how 
Waring and Milner dealt with the devastating critiques of Cambridge’s scientific practice 
from such luminaries as Joseph Priestley and, later, the irascible Charles Babbage. Although 
remarkably dissimilar in personality, the two Lucasian professors shared common strategies 
for preserving the place of spirit in the natural world, the primary articles of the Anglican 
Church and the “traditions” of university life. Yet, Knox argues, it would be a mistake to 
regard these two Lucasians as mere reactionaries, for their participation in the national and 
international republic of letters signalled some new characteristics of the nineteenth-century 
don. 
With Milner’s death in 1820 neither reform of the institution nor of the 
Professorship looked promising. As an undergraduate Babbage had satirised a bitter religious 
dispute in which Milner was a key player in an attempt to launch a revolutionary 
mathematical society; but partially due to Milner’s resistance, Babbage’s “Analytical Society” 
INTRODUCTION 
 35 
fizzled. Nevertheless, in the following decades the Lucasian professors played important 
roles in making Britain the pre-eminent scientific state and in changing the university from a 
“gentleman’s club” to a research institution. Concomitant with these transformations in the 
“holy city of mathematics” was the rising eminence of the professorship itself. In his account 
of the professorship from 1820-1838, Simon Schaffer recaptures the complex, and very 
divergent, interests of four Lucasian professors: Robert Woodhouse, Thomas Turton, 
Charles Babbage and George Biddell Airy. Along with vivid accounts of vicious electoral 
campaigns and combination room intrigue, Schaffer places the professors’ interests within a 
precarious university culture that simultaneously insisted upon maintaining its rich-if-dated 
scholarly traditions but realised that it needed to come to terms with the new philosophies of 
manufactures, machinery and political economy. Expertly glossing the careers of 
Woodhouse and Turton – whose tenure was arguably the nadir of the professorship – 
Schaffer concentrates on the ambitions and anxieties of George Biddell Airy and Charles 
Babbage. In addition to surveying the instruments and techniques that eventually made Airy 
a model Astronomer Royal, Schaffer describes Babbage’s obsession with improving the 
efficiency of Britain’s Imperial economy through rationalizing the emerging mechanisms of 
the factory system. Literally mechanizing mathematical reasoning with his calculating engine, 
Babbage forced less progressive Cambridge men like William Whewell to rethink what 
scholarship meant for both the university and for the Empire. 
George Gabriel Stokes was one of the new breed of Cambridge scientists that helped 
Whewell reformulate scientific practice at Cambridge and, indeed, throughout Britain. 
Contrasting the keen experimentalist with his competent-but-lacklustre predecessor, Joshua 
King, David Wilson portrays Stokes as a key arbiter of science. While producing 
groundbreaking research in optics and hydrodynamics, Stokes, as Professor and Secretary of 
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the Royal Society, was in a strategic position to comment upon myriad subjects – both 
scientific and cultural – that captivated Victorians: the luminiferous aether, spiritualism, the 
immortality of the soul, x-rays, radioactivity and Darwinian evolution. As for the last, Wilson 
describes how for Stokes, Victorian physics not only generated accounts of the cosmos 
which could be reconciled with Genesis, but also symbolized the high standard of scientific 
reasoning that Darwinianism, that potent weapon against Creationism, failed to reach.  
 Stokes may have been the last Lucasian professor of Victorian Cambridge, but it was 
said of his successor, Joseph Larmor, that his “heart was in the nineteenth century.” In his 
account of the twentieth century’s first new Lucasian professor, Andrew Warwick examines 
Larmor’s protracted quest to describe what he envisioned as the fundamental essence of the 
universe – a dynamical, luminiferous and electromagnetic medium. While some have viewed 
Larmor as a kind of anachronism unwilling to abandon an obsolete and fantastical concept, 
Warwick suggests that Larmor’s work has been gravely misrepresented and unearths the 
underlying sophistication of the professor’s dynamical ether. Larmor’s dynamical ether, 
Warwick shows, was more than a convenient way of unifying electromagnetic and optical 
phenomena: it represented an ontological reality that made progress in physics possible and 
revealed the underlying unity of nature. So, in the face of widespread claims that the 
Michelson-Morley experiment had failed to generate evidence of the aether, Larmor insisted 
that his ether theory explained why this null result was essential to the construction of 
theoretical physics. Warwick explains why this in turn enabled Larmor to construct a natural 
history of physics that placed this aether at the locus of an ineluctable and benevolent 
process of discovery.  
If Joseph Larmor is, somewhat unjustly, remembered for his reluctance to embrace 
new scientific theories, his successor, Paul Adrian Maurice Dirac is often memorialised for 
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revolutionising physics with audacious claims about the nature of the sub-microscopic 
world. Nevertheless, Dirac shared with Larmor what might be called a non-empirical 
methodology for favouring physical theories. In his exploration of the life Paul Dirac, Helge 
Kragh delves into the unusual mental world of the Nobel laureate, using Dirac’s vision of 
purity, rationality and beauty to excavate both the motives and the processes behind the 
professor’s startling work. As a “pure soul”, Dirac, Kragh explains, was obsessed with 
dissociating himself from the mire of traditional academia and scientific practice. As such, he 
usually worked in monastic isolation and was often viewed as an anti-social curmudgeon. 
Similarly, as a “fanatic of rationalism”, he scorned anything that seemed to him to smack of 
social interest, be it in reference to an experimental research programme or a political 
ideology. Kragh explains how this rationality, seemingly paradoxically, was integrated with a 
deep commitment to mathematical aesthetics. Such was his fixation with this enigmatic 
aesthetic that Dirac was wont to equate beauty with truth, and even reject experimental 
evidence if it conflicted with his notion of a beautiful equation. Yet, despite his unorthodox 
attitudes and working habits, Kragh shows exactly why so much of Dirac’s work remains 
central to modern, “orthodox” physics. 
Central too to the orthodox scientific world – but also to a host of unconventional 
creeds – is the work of the current Lucasian professor: Stephen Hawking. In the final 
chapter of this volume Hélène Mialet examines the remarkable and courageous life of “the 
prophet of the black hole.” Contrasting Hawking’s career with that of his predecessor, James 
Lighthill, and considering both the professor’s debilitating illness and the stunning 
theoretical achievements that helped make him famous, Mialet’s ingenious analysis follows 
the route that turned the seemingly most mortal of men into a celebrated oracle. By virtue of 
the timeless professorship he represents, the panoply of machines and humans that enable 
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him to work and the fact that his theoretical physics is often deployed in theological 
speculations, she argues that we can consider Hawking as a kind of angel who is at once 
seemingly immortal, immaterial and ubiquitous. Once considered a “stop-gap professor,” 
Hawking has metamorphosed into a beatified media darling whose opinions are sought from 
the White House to the Vatican. In so doing he has become the quintessential Lucasian 
professor. 
∞  ∞  ∞ 
The recent advances in computing, the technologies that keep Hawking at work and 
Hawking’s own statements concerning “the end of physics” give Mialet pause to speculate 
about the future of the Lucasian Chair. Is it possible, she wonders, if the mathematical 
professors will one day become superfluous? Fascinatingly, the professors themselves have 
from the beginning wondered about this eventuality. In 1675, the first two Lucasian 
professors – Isaac Barrow and Isaac Newton – were pessimistic about further advances in 
mathematics and therefore, presumably, what future mathematical professors would do with 
their time. According to reports, Newton was “intent upon Chimicall Studies and practises, 
and both he and Dr Barrow &c [were] beginning to think math[emati]call Speculations to 
grow at least nice and dry, if not somewhat barren.” This barrenness was a chimera, for, 
among other things, Newton’s own “Queries” gave investigators plenty of fertile regions to 
probe.  
Nevertheless, questions about the end of mathematical physics have resurfaced at the 
varsity. In 1874 James Clerk Maxwell reflected on a foreign “opinion” which “seems to have 
got abroad, that in a few years all the great physical constants will have been approximately 
estimated.” While some foreigners worried “that the only occupation which will then be left 
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to men of science will be to carry on these measurements to another place of decimals,” 
Maxwell was confident that “the materials for the subjugation of new regions” were being 
sown.38 The discovery of the electron, radioactivity and other dramatic events vindicated his 
optimism and gave physicists like Stokes new avenues of research. Yet, just a decade later 
Lord Kelvin, another close colleague of Stokes, speculated that accurate measurement was 
signalling a very different end for physics. He described two “clouds” over the dynamical 
theory of heat and light, a theory which most Victorian physicists – not least the Lucasians 
Stokes and Larmor – believed provided the most satisfactory unifying account of the 
physical world.39 For Kelvin, measurements of the specific heats of gases and the apparent 
non-motion of the earth relative to the ether posed serious problems for the equipartition 
theorem of energy developed for molecular behaviour and the electromagnetic ether.  
These problematic cornerstones of classical physics were eventually “dispersed” by 
two monuments of post-classical physics – Planck’s quantum theory and Einstein’s theory of 
relativity. These monuments gave both Paul Dirac and Stephen Hawking the opportunity to 
posit startling new conceptions of the universe; but by the end of the twentieth century it 
seemed that with the apparent unification of quantum mechanics and relativity theory post-
classical physics was at an end too. In his 1984 best-seller The Brief History of Time, Hawking 
cautioned that this goal had many “false dawns”, including Max Born’s notorious remark – 
made after Dirac had constructed his relativistic equation for the electron – that “Physics, as 
we know it, will be over in six months”. Yet Hawking has also declared that since “we know 
so much more about the universe … there are grounds for cautious optimism that we may 
now be near the end of the search for the ultimate laws of nature”. Part of his optimism may 
relate to the astonishing advances in computing, advances that have led Hawking himself to 
quip that he is “Intel inside.” It is doubtful, however, that Hawking equates the capacities of 
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silicon chip with artificial intelligence (AI), and it seems that in this millennium the 
investigations of the Lucasians will continue to be a very human enterprise. As Henry Lucas 
envisaged, the Lucasian professor will continue to “be a man [or woman] of good character 
and reputable life, at least a Master of Arts, soundly learned and especially skilled in the 
mathematical sciences.”40 
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